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Abstract: We used Bayesian methods to compare the predictions of probabilistic
risk assessment — the theoretical tool used by the nuclear industry to predict the fre-
quency of nuclear accidents — with empirical data. The existing record of accidents
with some simplifying assumptions regarding their probability distribution is sufficient
to rule out the validity of the industry’s analyses at a very high confidence level. We
show that this conclusion is robust against any reasonable assumed variation of safety
standards over time, and across regions. The debate on nuclear liability indicates that
the industry has independently arrived at this conclusion. We pay special attention to
the Indian situation, where we show that the existing operating experience provides
insufficient data to make any reliable claims about the safety of future reactors. We
briefly discuss some policy implications.
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1 Introduction
This paper was motivated by the recent public debates on the safety of nuclear reactors
in India. Although, this an old international debate, it has occupied a rather promi-
nent public position in India after the passage of the Indo-US nuclear deal. What is
significant is that the debate has not been confined to the technical community, but
has seen the active participation of peoples’ movements and civil society groups. This
work attempts to parse some of the claims made by the Indian nuclear establishment
and international nuclear vendors in this debate. Of course, while we have used the
Indian discussion to provide motivation and also specialized some of our conclusions to
India, the central conclusion that we draw regarding the conflict between the results of
probabilistic risk assessment and empirical data are valid more broadly.
In this paper, we analyze a framework called “probabilistic risk assessment” (PRA)
that is used by the nuclear industry to calculate the expected frequency of nuclear
accidents. As we review in section 3 below, the stated results for this expected frequency
are often extremely low. Although it likely as we describe in 8 that the industry
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and policy-makers are privately aware of the unreliability of these figures, they are
nevertheless used quite commonly in policy-debates. Thus, for example, the previous
chairperson of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission declared that the chance of a
nuclear accident in India was “1-in-infinity” [1].
Similar statements can be found in the scholarly literature. For example, in a
review of the 1000 MW VVER reactors that were installed in the South Indian city of
Kudankulam, officials from the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) pointed
out that the Core-Damage Frequency (CDF) of these reactors — the rate at which
the reactor is expected to suffer accidents that damage its core — was just 10−7 per
reactor-year (ry) [2].
The other two multinational companies that are in line to construct reactors in
India — the French company, Areva, whose European Pressurised Reactors (EPRs)
have been selected for Jaitapur (Maharashtra) and the the American company West-
inghouse, whose AP1000 reactors have been selected for Mithi Virdi (Gujarat) — have
also put forward similar figures. For example, Areva claims that the CDF of the EPR
is 7.08 × 10−7(ry)−1. (See p. 2 of [3].) Westinghouse has estimated the CDF of the
AP1000 to be 5.09× 10−7(ry)−1. (See Table 5-1 and Table 8-2 of [4].)
Prima facie, it is prudent to treat such low numbers skeptically, especially when
they are provided with a precision of two decimal places. A nuclear reactor is a very
complex system, and our understanding of its dynamics, particularly when they are
coupled to an uncertain external environment, is not advanced enough to permit such
accurate estimates.
Nevertheless, these numbers are taken seriously by regulators, both in India and
elsewhere. In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has set a goal
for PRA estimates of both the CDF and the large-release frequency (LRF). The latter
involves accidents where the containment fails in addition to core damage. These are
expected to be below 10−4(ry)−1 and 10−6(ry)−1 respectively. (See [5] and Appendix
D of [6].) Similar quantitative criterion have been adopted in other countries [7]. In
India, licensing guidelines suggest that new plants should have a PRA-estimated CDF
smaller than 10−5(ry)−1 and a LRF lower than 10−6(ry)−1. (See Annexure-1 of [8].)
The methodology used to carry out PRAs in the nuclear industry, which we review
in section 3, is theoretically suspect. However, the purpose of this article is to point
out that, even setting aside theoretical considerations, these extraordinarily low bounds
can be ruled out by using the existing empirical record of nuclear accidents.
There have already been eight core-damage accidents in a little more than fifteen
thousand reactor-years of experience as we review in section 4. Hence, the observed
frequency of accidents is significantly higher than that predicted by the industry’s
PRAs. Moreover, and this is the crucial conclusion of this paper: had the true frequency
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of accidents been as low as the manufacturers claim, it is exceedingly unlikely that so
many accidents could have occurred. Conversely, the historical record on accidents
implies that, even under rather conservative assumptions, it is possible to conclude
with a very high degree of confidence that the results of the industry’s PRAs are
incorrect.
For example, we show in section 5 that in a simplified model, even with favourable
assumptions for the industry, the hypothesis that the frequency of core-damage ac-
cidents is smaller than or equal to 10−7(ry)−1 can be ruled out with a confidence
of 1.0 − 4.0 × 10−24. (Said differently, within this model, we can conclude that the
core-damage frequency of nuclear reactors is higher than 10−7(ry)−1 with a confidence
of 99.9999999999999999999996%!) The precise value of 4.0 × 10−24 is specific to this
model but our broader and robust conclusion is that the accident-frequencies suggested
by PRA can be ruled out, even with the limited empirical data on accidents, at an ex-
tremely high confidence level. We perform a sensitivity analysis in section 6 and show
that even by allowing exponential increases in safety standards over time, or significant
variations across regions, it is virtually impossible to reconcile the empirical data with
the PRA-frequencies. In section 7, we turn briefly to the specific case of India. Here
we make the elementary statistical point that the existing experience of Indian reactor
operation is insufficient to derive any strong conclusions about expected accident fre-
quencies in the future. In section 8, we briefly discuss the debate on liability because
it shows that the nuclear industry is itself aware that the quantitative results of PRA
cannot be taken seriously for commercial questions like liability insurance. We conclude
in section 9.
2 Summary and Methodology
In this section, we provide a short summary of our objectives, methodology and results.
Our central objective in this paper is to use the empirical data to estimate the
probability for the hypothesis that the true frequency of accidents is indeed as low
as that claimed by PRA. We denote this probability by C(λpra, nobs) where λpra is a
frequency predicted by PRA and nobs is the observed number of accidents of a certain
type. Our central result is that
C(λpra, nobs) = ǫ≪ 1. (2.1)
The precise value of ǫ depends on many factors: the precise PRA being considered,
which leads to variations in λPRA, the way in which accidents are counted which leads
to variations in nobs and, of course, the assumptions that go into modeling nuclear
accidents and the variation of safety-standards over time and across regions.
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But the point that we want to emphasize in this paper is the following: ǫ is ex-
traordinarily small, and this fact is robust against virtually any variation of the consid-
erations above. The calculations presented in this paper are all calculations of ǫ under
different assumptions and they all have the feature that ǫ is negligible.
Note that we are not interested in using the empirical data to compute the true
frequency of accidents. Some efforts have been made in this direction [9, 10] but the
basic difficulty is that the empirical data is too limited to allow for a reliable compu-
tation of this frequency. The importance of focusing on ǫ is that these intermediate
uncertainties do not affect the robust nature of (2.1).
Second note that to compute ǫ, we are forced to use Bayesian analysis. While a
purely frequentist approach might demonstrate that the empirically observed frequency
of accidents does not agree with the frequency predicted by PRA this does not, by itself,
tell us the confidence level with which we can rule out the correctness of PRA. In fact
the question of estimating the confidence-level cannot be posed within the frequentist
approach at all. This confidence-level is given by 1− ǫ, and requires Bayesian methods.
We now turn to the main body of the paper.
3 A Brief Review of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
The systematic use of PRA in the nuclear industry started with the Rasmussen report
of 1975 [11]. This report was commissioned by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) and met with criticism soon after its publication. In 1977, the U.S.
NRC commissioned a review of the Rasmussen report through the Lewis Committee,
and following this critical review-report, released a statement in 1978 stating that “the
Commission does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study’s numerical estimates
of the overall risk of reactor accidents.” (See Pg. 533 of [12].) In spite of these early
objections, over the past few decades, the framework of probabilistic risk assessment
has become influential in propagating the use of quantitative probabilistic techniques
for questions of nuclear safety. Moreover, as described above, the use of these tech-
niques is not confined to qualitative safety analyses aided by quantitative probabilistic
techniques, but rather the actual numerical results produced by PRA are used by reg-
ulators, and in policy debates.
The basic idea used by such studies is simple to describe: one enumerates the
possible fault trees that could lead to an accident. For each individual component
in the reactor, one can estimate a frequency of failure. For a serious accident, some
combination of these components has to fail simultaneously. The industry advertises a
philosophy of “defense in depth”, which reduces the overall possibility of an accident
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by building redundancy into a system. The low numbers above result from the fact
that several systems have to fail simultaneously before the core is damaged.
For example, Keller and Modarres [13] report that in 1966, in one of the earliest
such assessments, the General Electric company “showed” that its reactors “had a one-
in-a-million chance per year for a catastrophic failure because each of the three major
subsystems would only fail once-in-one-hundred per years” (sic). The Rasmussen re-
port, which followed a decade later, attempted to refine and formalize this methodology.
The theoretical problem with such estimates is obvious. Consider the Fukushima
nuclear complex, which had 13 backup diesel generators [14]. Assigning a probability of
10−1 for the failure of each generator per year and assuming that they are independent
would lead us to the naive conclusion that the probability that 12 generators would fail
together in any given year is about 13 × 10−12 × 0.9 ≈ 10−11. However, the tsunami
did precisely this by disabling all but one of the generators at once. The point is that
once the obvious fault trees have been eliminated and corrected, we reach a stage where
the dominant contributions to accident-probabilities come from unlikely sequences of
events that conspire to cause a failure.
This issue occurs in any suitably complex system. However, a nuclear reactor is also
an open system that is coupled to an external environment. This makes it virtually
impossible to foresee all sorts of low probability pathways to failure. Furthermore,
our understanding of the frequency of extreme initiating events, such as tsunamis and
earthquakes, is itself rather crude. These error bars overwhelm the seemingly accurate
predictions that result from elaborate simulations of the reactor.
However, instead of venturing deeper into these theoretical arguments — which are
considered in greater detail elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, [15]) — we
will examine how the predictions of PRA stand up against the extant empirical data.
To facilitate this comparison, let us summarize the various kinds of claims that have
been made by the three multinational companies relevant to India. As we mentioned,
Areva has estimated that the CDF of an EPR accounting for both internal and external
hazards is 7.08× 10−7(ry)−1. The LRF of the EPR is estimated to be about 11% of its
CDF: 7.69× 10−8(ry)−1. (See p. 14 of [3] and p. 222 of [16].)
Similarly, Westinghouse has estimated that the CDF of the AP1000 is 5.09 ×
10−7(ry)−1. The LRF of this reactor is estimated to be 5.94×10−8(ry)−1. (See Table 8-
2 of [4].) This includes accidents due to “external hazards” including “external flooding,
extreme winds, seismic, and transportation accidents”. In fact Westinghouse concluded
that “conservative bounding assessments show that core damage risk from events listed
above is small compared to the core damage risk from at-power and shutdown events.”
(See p. 4-37 of [4].)
Although the NPCIL has stated that the CDF of the Kudankulam VVER reactors
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is 10−7(ry)−1, we were unable to locate the details of the PRA that led to this conclusion.
So, we will take this figure as is, and consider a LRF of 10−8(ry)−1 using the common
estimate that the LRF “is generally about ten times less than CDF” [17]. All these
claims are summarized in Table 1.
Reactor (Manufacturer) Core-Damage Frequency Large-Release Frequency
EPR (Areva) 7.08× 10−7(ry)−1 7.69× 10−8(ry)−1
AP1000 (Westinghouse) 5.09× 10−7(ry)−1 5.94× 10−8(ry)−1
VVER (Rosatom) 10−7(ry)−1 10−8(ry)−1
Table 1: Predictions of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
4 Review of the Empirical Experience
We now review the historical record on nuclear accidents. The industry, as a whole,
had gathered about Tobs = 15247 reactor-years of operating experience by the end of
2012 according to the latest data put out by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). (See Table 4 of [18].) In this time, there have been several core-damage
accidents.
Surprisingly, the IAEA does not maintain a comprehensive historical record of
core-damage accidents. Cochran and McKinzie have compiled a very useful list of 25
such instances from various sources [19]. In our analysis, we will only consider acci-
dents that occurred at commercial reactors, thus excluding accidents at experimental
facilities like Enrico Fermi Unit-1 (1966) or Lucens (1969). Even this enumeration is
somewhat subjective, but a conservative approach, keeping only accidents that involved
a significant meltdown of fuel leads to the list in Table 2. In each case, we have also
provided references to more detailed descriptions of these accidents.
Table 2 enumerates accidents at ncdobs = 8 reactors. Of these 8 accidents, n
lr
obs = 5
accidents led to the release of large amounts of radioactive substances into the envi-
ronment. This list comprises the accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and the
three at Fukushima. Since we have PRA results for both the CDF and the LRF, we
can compare these separately to the historical record.
The reason for counting the three accidents at Fukushima separately in the list
above is that we are interested in the rate of accidents per reactor-year of operation,
and all these three reactors contribute separately to the “total operating experience”
that appears in the denominator.
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Reactor Country Year Reference Note
Saint-Laurent A-1 France 1969 p. 35 of [20] Meltdown of 50 kg of fuel.
Three Mile Island
Unit 2
USA 1977 [21] Severe accident; radiation
release.
Saint-Laurent A-2 France 1980 Table 12 of
[22] and [19]
Meltdown of one channel of
fuel.
Chernobyl Unit 4 Ukraine 1986 [23] Severe accident; large radi-
ation release.
Greifswald Unit 5 Germany
(GDR)
1989 [24, 25, 26, 19] Partial core meltdown soon
after commissioning.
Fukushima Daiichi
Units 1,2,3
Japan 2011 [27] Severe accident; large radi-
ation release.
Table 2: List of core-damage accidents in commercial reactors
We comment more on this issue in section 9. However, to demonstrate the robust
nature of our conclusions, we will present a parallel analysis where the accidents at
Fukushima are counted together. By this (incorrect) counting, there have been ncdlow = 6
core-damage accidents and nlrlow = 3 accidents with a large release of radioactivity.
5 Simplified Bayesian Analysis of Empirical Frequencies and
PRA
Table 2 leads to the following observed frequency of core-damage and large-release
accidents.
νcdobs =
ncdobs
Tobs
≈
1
1906
(ry)−1 ≈ 5.2× 10−4(ry)−1,
ν lrobs =
nlrobs
Tobs
≈
1
3049
(ry)−1 ≈ 3.3× 10−4(ry)−1.
(5.1)
Counting the Fukushima accidents as a single accident, we find
νcdlow =
ncdlow
Tobs
≈
1
2541
(ry)−1 ≈ 3.9× 10−4(ry)−1,
ν lrlow =
nlrlow
Tobs
≈
1
5082
(ry)−1 ≈ 2.0× 10−4(ry)−1.
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It is clear that these empirically observed frequencies are far higher than the pre-
dictions of the manufacturers’ PRAs. However, we can ask a more detailed question:
given the observed rate of accidents, what is the probability that the results of PRA
are close to, or smaller than, the “true frequency” of accidents.
Bayesian techniques are ideally suited to answer this question, and we return to
this issue again below. To answer the question above,
we need to make a few simplifying assumptions about the probability distribution
of nuclear accidents. As a first approximation, we start by assuming that nuclear
accidents are independent events, and that in every small time interval dt, each reactor
has a small and constant probability
dp = λ dt, (5.2)
of suffering an accident. The use of this approximation is not meant to suggest that it
is truly the case that accident frequencies have not changed over time. Rather, as we
show in section 6 our results are very robust against almost any reasonable assumed
changes in safety standards over time, and across regions.
Therefore, given this robustness of our central results, we present this simplified
model first since it is amenable to simple analysis and already captures the central
points that we wish to make. The reader who is interested in a more sophisticated
analysis should consult the next section.
Say that we have m reactors functioning simultaneously which we observe for a
time period T1 = Ndt. The probability for n of these to have undergone accidents is
pλ(n) =
(
m
n
)(
1− λdt)N(m−n)
(
1−
(
1− λdt
)N)n
=
(
m
n
)(
1−
λT1
N
)N(m−n)(
1−
(
1−
λT1
N
)N)n
−→
N→∞
Γ(m+ 1)
Γ(m− n + 1)Γ(n+ 1)
e−λT1m(1−
n
m
)
(
1− e−λT1
)n
,
where, in the last line, we have taken the continuous limit: N → ∞, with T1 finite.
We remind the reader that Γ(n + 1) = n! is the standard Gamma function. We now
consider the case where λT1 ≪ 1, which implies that the chance of any individual
reactor undergoing an accident is small, and n ≪ m, which states that only a small
fraction of all reactors undergo an accident. In this limit, the total operating experience
gathered becomes T = mT1, and we see that the distribution simplifies to
pλ(n) =
1
Γ(n+ 1)
(λT )ne−λT . (5.3)
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This is just a Poisson distribution and we could even have started with this distribution,
which is commonly used to model accidents and other rare events in various scenarios.
It is now possible to solve the following Bayesian problem: start with the prior
assumption that λ is uniformly distributed
P(λ) =
θ(λ)− θ(λ− λc)
λc
, (5.4)
where λc is an irrelevant high frequency cutoff to make the distribution normalizable.
Given the observed frequency of events above, what is the posterior probability distri-
bution for λ?
Let us try and explain this in simple words. Say we start with no prior bias for
the value of λ. Given that we have some number nobs of accidents, we can use this
empirical data to form an estimate as to the value of λ. In fact, Bayes theorem tells us
that we can actually calculate the probability that the true frequency of accidents has
a value between λ and λ+ dλ through the formula
P(λ|nobs) =
P(nobs|λ)P(λ)
P(nobs)
.
This formula is just making precise that intuition that the empirical evidence is giving
us some information about the value of λ in our world.
On the right hand side, P(nobs|λ) = pλ(nobs), which is given by the Poisson dis-
tribution (5.3). P(λ) is our flat prior probability distribution in (5.4). To fix P(nobs),
which is a λ independent constant, we can simply demand that
∫∞
0
P(λ|nobs)dλ = 1.
After fixing this constant we find that the posterior probability distribution for λ
is given by
P(λ|nobs) =
1
Γ(nobs + 1)
Tobs(λTobs)
nobse−λTobs , (5.5)
where we have neglected terms of O
(
e−λcTobs
)
, assuming λc is taken to be large enough.
This function is plotted in figure 1 for the values of nobs that are relevant to both the
large-release and the core-damage frequency.
We pause to mention a somewhat subtle point. Since the observed number of events
is small, nobs ∼ O(1), the curves in figure 1 have an appreciable width. This indicates
the difficulty with using a frequentist approach to estimating the true frequency of
accidents using empirical data. However, as we emphasized in section 2 if we are
interested in estimating the parameter ǫ in (2.1) instead, then Bayesian methods yield
a robust statement. We now turn to this calculation.
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Figure 1: Posterior probability distribution for the parameter λ
To estimate ǫ, we use (5.5) to calculate the probability that the probability that λ
is smaller than any given λ0. This function is given by
C(λ0, nobs) =
∫ λ0
0
P(λ|nobs) dλ = 1−
Γ(1 + nobs, Tobsλ0)
Γ(1 + nobs)
. (5.6)
where Γ(k, z) is the incomplete gamma function. The function C(λ0, n) is shown in
figure 2 for all the relevant values of n.
5e-4 1e-3 1.5e-3
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
C(

0
,n
)
n=8
n=6
n=5
n=3
Figure 2: Probability for the hypothesis λ < λ0
Since the probability that the true frequency is smaller than the various results of
PRA is so close to zero, it cannot be read off the graph. However, we can use the series
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expansion
Γ(k, z) = Γ(k)−
xk
k
+
xk+1
k + 1
+ O
(
xk+2
)
. (5.7)
This leads to the numerical figures given in Table 3. The phrase “PRA ... is right”
is shorthand for the hypothesis that the true frequency of accidents is lower than or
equal to the frequency predicted by PRA . Therefore, the table lists the values of the
function C(λ0, nobs) from (5.6) with λ0 set to the PRA-predicted frequency and nobs set
to the observed number of accidents, which varies depending on whether the Fukushima
accidents are counted together or separately. Note that the values for the probabilities
in this table correspond precisely to the parameter ǫ in (2.1).
Reactor Probability PRA CDF is right Probability PRA LRF is right
Fukushima separate Fukushima together Fukushima separate Fukushima together
Kudankulam 1× 10−31 4× 10−24 2× 10−26 2× 10−17
EPR 5× 10−24 3× 10−18 4× 10−21 8× 10−14
AP1000 3× 10−25 3× 10−19 8× 10−22 3× 10−14
Table 3: Comparing PRA results with Bayesian estimates from historical observations (Sim-
plified Model)
One observes immediately that, given the empirical data, the probability that
the industry’s PRA-based conclusions are right is astronomically small. As we stated
in the introduction, this implies that with almost perfect certainty we can conclude
that the true frequency of accidents is much larger than the figures advertised by the
manufacturers.
We emphasize that the figures in Table 3 should not be used as precise numerical
bounds on the validity of the PRA results. The precise values of ǫ listed there suffers
from several uncertainties that we have already mentioned. As we show in the next
section upon consideration of a more sophisticated model, the numerical values of these
probabilities change but the robust statement is that they always remain extremely
small.
In words, the results of Table 3 can be stated by means of the following straight-
forward conclusion: the historical data on nuclear accidents provides overwhelming
evidence that the methodology of probabilistic risk assessment is seriously flawed. A
corollary is that the observed frequency of accidents contradicts the industry’s claim
that the probability of an accident is negligible.
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6 Robustness of the Simplified Model
In this section, we model possible improvements in safety standards over time, and
variations in accident frequencies across regions. We show that the central results of
the simplified Bayesian model above are very robust against any reasonable assumed
variations of this kind. However, as the reader will note the analysis of this section is
mathematically more involved and therefore the reader who is willing to accept this
conclusion may skip this section on a first reading.
6.1 Modelling Improvements in Safety over Time
To model possible improvements in safety over time, we now relax the assumption made
in (5.2) and allow the probability of an accident to vary with time. We first discuss a
general framework to model this possibility and then discuss a concrete model.
6.1.1 Framework for Time-Variations of Safety
The probability that an accident occurs between time t and t+ dt is given by
dp(t) = λ{α}(t)dt,
where the subscript {α} indicates a set of parameters that control the variation of λ in
time.
Now, consider a time interval of length T , which we divide into N equal parts set
off by 0 < t1 < t2 . . . tN−1 < T with ti+1 − ti = dt. To specify the pattern of accidents
note now that a single number is not enough, but instead we require a function N(i),
which tells us whether an accidents occurred in the interval [ti, ti+1]. This is defined
through
N(i) =
{
1, if an accident occurs in the interval [ti, ti+1]
0, otherwise
Clearly, the probability for any such pattern of accidents is given by
p({Ni}|{α}) = Υ{α}
∏
Ni=1
λ{α}(ti)dt
∏
Ni=0
(1− λ{α}(ti)),
where Υ{α} is a normalization factor that we discuss below. Note that this probability is
infinitesimal for any given patternN(i), and this is not surprising since in the continuum
limit, we need to do a path integral over all possible patterns of accidents. However,
as we see below for our purpose of constructing the posterior probability distribution,
this constant will not be important.
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In the continuum limit, if n accidents are observed at times ti1 . . . tin , then we find
that
P ({Ni}|{α}) ∝
[∏
j
λ{α}(tij )
]
e−
∫ T
0
λ(t)dt
Then, once again using Bayes theorem, we find that
P ({α}|{Ni}) =
P ({Ni}|{α})P({α})
P({Ni})
We see therefore that the unknown normalization constants drop out and that the pos-
terior probability distribution for the parameters upon observation of a certain pattern
of accidents is given by
P ({α}|{Ni}) = N
[∏
j
λ{α}(tij )
]
e−
∫ T
0
λ(t)dtP({α})
where P({α}) is the prior probability distribution for the parameters and the normal-
ization N is now a simple finite quantity that is simply fixed by∫
P ({α}|{Ni}) d{α} = 1
6.1.2 A Concrete Model
We now turn to a concrete model that shows how the framework above may be utilized.
We assume a variation of probability with time as
λ(t) = λie
−γt. (6.1)
Here t is the total operating experience accumulated by the industry. We assume that
γ > 0 and this models the frequency of accidents as starting with λi and decreasing
exponentially with time as the industry gains additional experience. This model of an
exponential increase in safety standards constitutes a very favourable assumption for
the industry but we will see that even allowing for this, our central conclusions are
unchanged. Of course, the reader can easily generalize these results to more general
variations of the frequency.
Furthermore, we assume a flat prior distribution of the form (5.4) for both λi and
γ.
P(λi) =
θ(λi)− θ(λi − λci)
λci
P(γ) =
θ(γ)− θ(γ − γc)
γc
,
(6.2)
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where λci and γ
c are cutoffs. As we described above, the cutoff on λi is irrelevant, but
in this exponential model we have to be somewhat careful about the cutoff γc. This is
because if we assume a prior that is flat over very large ranges of γ, then this allows for
a fat-tail in the posterior distribution that represents the scenario where the accident
frequencies were very large in the past but have improved rapidly very recently. We will
make a specific numerical choice of cutoff below, although we postpone the question
for the moment.
We should emphasize two subtleties. First, while the cutoff, γc is clearly physically
important and changes the numerical values of probabilities, it it not strictly required
for convergence. Second, while the flat priors in (6.2) reflect our ignorance about these
parameters this necessarily involves a choice of basis. Note, for example, that assuming
a flat prior for the initial frequency λi is different from assuming a flat prior for the
current frequency λ(T ).
Now consider the case where n accidents have been observed at times ti1 , . . . tin in
a total operating time T . Define τ =
∑
j tij . Then it is clear from the analysis above
that the posterior probability distribution for λi, γ is
P (λi, γ|{Ni}) = Nλ
n
i e
−γτ−
λi
γ
(
1−e−γT
)
(6.3)
We can determine the marginal probability distributions for both λi and γ by
integrating over the other variable. In particular, the distribution for γ can be obtained
by doing the easy integral over λi and is given by
P (γ|{Ni}) =
∫ ∞
0
dλiP (λi, γ|{Ni}) = N e
−γτΓ(n + 1)
(
γ
1− e−γT
)n+1
On the other hand, it does not appear possible to write the distribution for λi in
terms of elementary functions. However, a double-infinite series representation can be
obtained as follows by expanding the exponentials.
P (λi|{Ni}) =
∫ γc
0
dγP (λi, γ|{Ni})
= N
∫ γc
0
dγ
∞∑
m,q=0
(
(−1)qe−
λi
α λm+ni α
q−m(mT + τ)q
Γ(m+ 1)Γ(q + 1)
)
= N
∞∑
m,q=0
(−1)qλn+q+1i (mT + τ)
qΓ
(
m− q − 1, λi
γc
)
Γ(m+ 1)Γ(q + 1)
.
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By integrating these distributions, we also obtain the value of the normalization
constant N through
1 =
∫
P (γ|{Ni}) dγ =
∫
P (λi|{Ni}) dλi
= N
∞∑
q=0
Γ(n+ q + 1)(qT + τ)−n−2(Γ(n+ 2)− Γ(n+ 2, γc(qT + τ)))
Γ(q + 1)
which yields an expression for N as the inverse of an infinite sum.
Another interesting quantity is the posterior probability distribution for the “cur-
rent accident frequency” λT = λie
−γT . We can change variables in (6.3), after including
a Jacobian factor, to obtain
P (λT , γ|{Ni}) = Nλ
n
T e
−γτ+
λT (1−eγT )
γ
+γ(n+1)T
As usual the probability that λi is smaller than a given value, λ0, or the probability
that γ is smaller than some γ0 is given by integrating the probability distributions above.
Cγ(γ0, {Ni}) =
∫ γ0
0
P (γ|{Ni}) dγ
Ci(λ0, {Ni}) =
∫ λ0
0
P (λi|{Ni}) dλi
CT (λ
0
T , {Ni}) =
∫ λ0
T
0
dλT
∫ γc
0
dγP (λT , γ|{Ni})
While it is possible to write these expressions in terms of an infinite series of elementary
functions, these forms are too complicated to be useful. It is, of course, possible to
evaluate these expressions numerically at any given point as we do below.
We now turn to the numerical values of these expressions at the empirically rel-
evant points. Since the expressions above depend on the specific times at which the
accidents occurred, we need some additional information: the reactor-years of operat-
ing experience that the industry had accumulated at the time of the accidents listed
in Table 2. Using Table 7 of [18], we can estimate these figures for the years in which
the accidents occurred, by simply adding the number of operating reactors, as given
in that table. This estimate is more than sufficient for our purposes and results in the
Table 4.
Finally, to obtain numerical values we also need to choose a value for the cutoff on
the rate of improvement. We choose
γc =
ln(50)
Tobs
,
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Accident Year Operating Experience (ry)
Saint-Laurent A-1 1969 391
Three Mile Island 1977 1406
Saint-Laurent A-2 1980 2048
Chernobyl Unit 4 1984 3150
Greifswald Unit 5 1989 5061
Fukushima Units 1,2,3 2011 14572
Table 4: Operating Experience (Reactor-Years) Accumulated by the Industry at the Time of
Each Accident
which indicates our prior assumption that safety standards in the industry have im-
proved by, at most, a factor of 50 from early commercial nuclear reactors. Of course,
the reader can consider other values of the cutoff and as we mentioned earlier it is even
possible to remove the cutoff altogether.
With these numerical values, it is possible to plot the various probability distribu-
tion functions given above. The posterior probability distributions for λT and γ are
plotted in Figure 3. The alert reader may note that the probability distribution for
n = 5 is peaked to the right of the distribution for n = 6. This is because the case
with n = 5 represents the analysis for large-release accidents, where the Fukushima
accidents are counted separately. This tends to disfavour large values of γ, since in
this counting, 3 out of 5 accidents happened at late times. By thus disfavouring rapid
recent improvements in safety, this particular case tends to disfavour low values of λT ,
and this is why the distribution with n = 6 is peaked to the right of the case with n = 5
even though the observed number of accidents is larger in this case.
Eventually we are interested in the probability for the hypothesis that the true
frequency of accidents is smaller than or equal to the value predicted by PRA. Using
these values, we can now obtain the analogue of Table 3. Below, we display the relevant
values of C(λ0T |{Ni}) at the same points as in Table 3. This is the probability that
the true current frequency of accidents is smaller than the values given by the PRAs
considered below. We have also plotted this probability as a function of λ0T in Figure
4.
It is sometimes believe that since safety standards have been improving over time,
the results of PRA may be valid for newer reactors even if they are inconsistent with the
empirical data for older reactors. The calculations above rule out this possibility and
reinforce our conclusion that the results of PRA cannot be reconciled with empirical
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Figure 3: Posterior Probability Distributions for the two parameters of the model.
Reactor Probability PRA CDF is right Probability PRA LRF is right
Fukushima separate Fukushima together Fukushima separate Fukushima together
Kudankulam 7× 10−24 2× 10−17 3× 10−22 5× 10−14
EPR 3× 10−16 1× 10−11 5× 10−17 2× 10−10
AP1000 1× 10−17 1× 10−12 1× 10−17 6× 10−11
Table 5: Comparing PRA results with Bayesian estimates from historical observations after
allowing exponential increase in safety standards
data.
6.2 Regional Variations
It is clear that the safety of nuclear reactors may vary across regions. However, just
as in our analysis of possible improvements in safety over time, we now show that no
reasonable variation in safety across regions can lend any confidence to the results of
PRA-calculations.
In the case of regional variations, it would be inappropriate to proceed along the
lines of (6.1) since there is no reason to expect that safety will vary monotonically along
any spatial parameterization of nuclear reactors.
However, the central point is that for any particular country or region, the experi-
ence of nuclear accidents in the rest of the world provides a reasonable prior estimate
of the frequency of accidents in that region. If we have reason to believe, from the
record of smaller incidents or from some other information, that safety in that region
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Figure 4: Probability for the hypothesis λT < λ
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is better or worse than other parts of the world, we can account for this factor as well
in our prior distribution. This prior distribution can then be corrected using empirical
data from the region itself to obtain a final posterior distribution for the frequency of
accidents.
We now describe, more precisely, how this procedure can be implemented. Consider
a particular region, R, which may be a country or a group of countries. In this region,
we assume that the probability of an accident in the interval [t, t+dt] is given by (5.2).
dp = λRdt
In this subsection, we do not consider additional variations of accident frequencies with
time, to avoid complicating the analysis. In addition, we have the complement of the
region (the rest of the world), R˜, and we assume that in R˜, the probability of an
accident in an interval of length dt is given by
dp = λ˜Rdt
Assuming a flat prior distribution for λ˜R, we now construct a posterior probability
distribution for this parameter. Assuming that nR˜ accidents have been observed in the
rest of the world in a total operating time TR˜, we use the techniques of section 5 to
construct the posterior probability distribution for λ˜R, which is given by
P(λ˜R|n˜R) =
1
Γ(n˜R + 1)
T˜R(λ˜RT˜R)
n˜Re−λ˜RT˜R .
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Now, we then additionally input the assumption that the prior distribution for λR
is the same as the posterior distribution for λ˜R, except for a constant of proportionality
κ between them. The factor κ indicates our prior belief that nuclear safety in region R
is better or worse than that in other parts of the world.
For example, we could obtain an estimate for κ using a record of less severe incidents
(not necessarily core-damage or large-release) that have occurred in R and R˜
κ =
IR
I˜R
,
where IR, I˜R are the number of incidents recorded in R and R˜ respectively. It is, of
course, necessary to have a precise criterion to count the incidents above, and we give
one example below. Since incidents of lower severity are fairly frequent, therefore a
purely frequentist analysis is sufficient to obtain an estimate for κ.
After fixing κ using this technique, or some other, we then take the prior distribu-
tion for λR to be
P(λR) =
1
κ
P(λ˜R|n˜R)
∣∣∣∣
λ˜R=
λR
κ
=
1
κn˜R+1Γ(n˜R + 1)
T˜R(λRT˜R)
n˜Re−
λRT˜R
κ (6.4)
Now, denoting the number of accidents observed inside region R by nR, in a total
operating time TR, we can construct a posterior probability distribution for λR using
the same techniques and the prior in (6.4). This leads to
P(λR|nR) =
TR +
T˜R
κ
Γ(nR + n˜R + 1)
((TR +
T˜R
κ
)λR)
n˜R+nRe−λR(TR+
T˜R
κ
)
The probability for the hypothesis that λR < λ0 is given by
CR(λ0, nR) =
Γ(1 + nR + n˜R, (TR +
T˜R
κ
)λ0)
Γ(1 + nR + n˜R)
.
So, we see that in this model, we obtain a simple result. The rule is that to account
for variations in safety across regions, we simply count the total accidents n˜R + nR as
having occurred in a time TR +
T˜R
κ
. In the situation where we take κ = 1, we recover
the results of section 5 since TR + T˜R just becomes the total operating experience Tobs.
Now the key point is as follows. If we recall the expansion of the incomplete gamma
function shown in (5.7) we find that for small λ0(TR +
T˜R
κ
) the expressions above are
well approximated by
CR(λ0, nR) ≈
(
λ0(TR +
T˜R
κ
)
)nR+n˜R+1
Γ(nR + n˜R + 2)
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If we now take λ0 to be one of the values given in Table 1 we see that the expression
above necessarily evaluates to an extremely small number.
To take a numerical example, let us take the region under consideration to be
France. At the end of 2012, France had accumulated about TR = 1874 reactor-years of
operating experience, without a single large-release event. (See Table 4 in [18].) In the
same period the rest of the world had accumulated T˜R = Tobs − TR = 13373 reactor-
years of operating experience. We also take κ = 0.5, which suggests a prior belief that
French reactors are twice as safe as the world-average. We emphasize that this value
of κ is being taken here just as an example, and not to suggest that this is really the
case.
With these parameters, given that there have been five large release events in the
rest of the world, and taking the PRA frequency estimate for the French EPR reactor
given above, we see that
CR(7.69× 10
−8, 5) = 1.6× 10−19.
Therefore, given the existing empirical experience in the rest of the world, even with an
assumption that French reactors are considerably safer, the probability that the EPR
reactor genuinely has a true frequency of accidents as small as the predictions of PRA
is absurdly low.
It is clear that the models in this section can be extended further to account for
more detailed variations. However, the analysis of this section shows that the severe
contradiction between the results of PRA and empirical data cannot be resolved in any
such manner.
7 On the Indian Experience
We now turn to the Indian experience. The correct procedure to analyze this case
would be to use the rest of the world’s experience as a prior distribution as was done in
section 6.2. Needless to say, with any reasonable choice of κ, as defined there, we would
end up with the conclusion that ǫ≪ 1 for India. However, in this short subsection, we
want to briefly take a separate approach to make an elementary statistical point. Even
if one assumes that the existing record of nuclear accidents has absolutely no bearing on
the Indian situation, India’s operating experience of Tind = 394 reactor years [28] is too
low to provide any statistical confidence in the safety of the Indian nuclear programme.
The significance of this observation pertains to common claims made by the In-
dian nuclear establishment that Indian reactors are safer since India has not witnessed
a major accident in this time period. The point of this section is to point out that
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such claims are statistically fallacious. While we have phrased our discussion in In-
dia’s context, it is worth noting that several countries have accumulated similar levels
of operating experience. To take a few examples, by the end of 2012, Belgium had
accumulated 254 reactor-years, China had accumulated 141 reactor-years, Canada had
accumulated 634 reactor-years, the republic of Korea had accumulated 404. Although
none of these countries have seen a major accident, the conclusions of this section apply
to all of them: their operating experience is insufficient to suggest that safety levels in
these countries are significantly different from the world-average.
In mathematical terms, in this section our objective is somewhat different from
the rest of the paper. Here, we are not trying to estimate ǫ (from (2.1)) and show
that it is very small, but rather we would like to show that even if one discards the
reasonable prior assumptions made in section 6.2, there is no reason to suppose that
ǫ ∼ 1 for these countries. As explained above, the numerical figures that we take below
are specific to India, but the reader can easily modify this calculation to the other
countries mentioned above.
There have been several minor but no major accidents in India’s operating history.
We again start with a flat prior distribution for the mean frequency of accidents at
Indian reactors, which we denote by λind to distinguish it from the global frequency.
Then the posterior distribution for λind is given by
Qind(λind) = Tinde
−λindTind,
Note we can obtain this by setting nobs → 0 and Tobs → Tind in (5.5). This curve is
plotted in figure 5.
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Figure 5: Posterior probability distribution for λind
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This figure tapers off quite gently, so India’s current operating experience cannot
tell us much about the frequency of accidents in India, especially if the true frequency
is around νcdobs in (5.1).
To make this sharper, it is useful to look at the probability for the hypothesis that
λind < λ0. This probability is given by the function
Cind(λ0) =
∫ λ0
0
Qind(λ) dλ = 1− e
−Tindλ0 .
This curve is shown in figure 6.
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Figure 6: Probability for the hypothesis λind < λ0
Some relevant numerical figures are
Cind(2.67× 10
−4) ≈ 0.10,
Cind(1.0× 10
−3) ≈ 0.33.
In words, this indicates that it is only with a confidence of about 10% that we can state
that the true frequency of accidents is smaller than once in 3700 reactor-years. And it
is only with a confidence of about 33% that we can conclude that the true frequency
of accidents in India is smaller than once per thousand reactor-years.
These results are very simple to understand intuitively. They simply reflect the
fact that even if the expected frequency of accidents in India is once every thousand
reactor-years, there is still an excellent chance that one could get through 394 reactor-
years without an accident. Conversely, the absence of an accident in this time period
is not particularly informative.
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It is quite common to find claims like the one made by the Indian Nuclear Society
its advertisement for a 2012 conference. “Having achieved safe and reliable operation
of about 360 reactor- years . . . the Indian nuclear programme has demonstrated a high
level of maturity. The safety track record of Indian nuclear power plants has been im-
peccable” [29]. These claims are accepted at the highest levels of government. In 2011,
the Prime Minister stated that “The safety track record of our nuclear power plants
over the past 335 reactor-years of operation has been impeccable” [30]. Our analysis
shows that it is erroneous to draw these complacent conclusions. India’s operating
experience is too limited to provide statistically reliable long term estimates about the
efficacy or otherwise of safety practices in the nuclear sector.
In passing, we should point out that, within the nuclear industry, it appears to
be a rather common statistical error to extrapolate from limited experience to rather
strong claims of safety. For example, the Rasmussen report also stated that “It is
significant that in some 200 reactor-years of commercial operation of reactors of the
type considered in the report there have been no fuel melting accidents.” (See p. 6 of
[11].) However, this experience had absolutely no significance for the conclusion drawn
by the report, which was that the core-damage frequency of reactors was once in 20,000
years (p. 8).
8 The Debate on Nuclear Liability
It is clear that the results of PRA are untenable in the light of empirical data. In this
section we provide evidence, using the debate on nuclear liability, that the industry’s
actions (as opposed to its public statements) suggest that it has independently reached
this conclusion.
Soon after the nuclear deal, multinational nuclear suppliers lobbied the govern-
ment to pass a law that would indemnify them in the event of an accident. Under
this pressure, the government passed a liability law in 2010 that was almost identical
to the annex of a U.S. sponsored international convention on the subject called the
Convention on Supplementary Compensation [31, 32]. However, as a result of various
pulls-and-pushes in the legislative process, nuclear suppliers are largely protected but
not completely indemnified by the Indian law. While victims cannot sue the supplier,
the law allows the NPCIL, which has the primary responsibility of compensating vic-
tims, to recover some of this compensation from the supplier for a disaster caused by
substandard equipment. The refusal of suppliers to accept even this marginal liability
has presented a significant obstacle for contracts for new reactors. (See for example,
the recent statement by the CEO of General Electric [33].)
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It is significant that although one of primary advertised benefits of the Indo-US
nuclear deal was that India would be able to purchase light water reactors from new
suppliers, the deadlock on liability has prevented this entirely. The first new contract
for reactors after the nuclear deal was signed in 2014 with the Russian public sector
company Rosatom. However, this will just extend the Kudankulam nuclear complex
which was covered by an inter-governmental agreement even before the nuclear deal.
Negotiations with suppliers from markets that have opened up after the nuclear deal,
including companies from France and the United States, have so-far failed to yield a
single new contract due to the conflict on liability.
However, this leads directly to the following question: if the chance of a nuclear
accident is indeed as remote as the industry claims, then why are nuclear reactor
manufacturers unwilling to accept liability for an accident?
One of the ostensible reasons given by suppliers is that forcing them to accept
liability would cause the cost of power to go up [34].
To examine the veracity of this claim, consider the expected cost of insurance for
suppliers if the results of PRA are taken at face value by the industry and actuaries
[35].
The Indian liability law currently caps the total available compensation for victims
at “the rupee equivalent of three hundred million Special Drawing Rights”(SDRs). (See
clause 6 of the text of the law [36].) This includes compensation from the operator,
and also the central government, and victims are not legally entitled to any further
compensation. Here we consider the worst case scenario for the supplier, where it
becomes liable for this entire amount.
Although the rupee to SDR exchange rate fluctuates, this maximum liability is
approximately ℓcap = Rs. 2, 500 crores = Rs. 2.5× 1010 in rupee terms.
Taking, for example, the claimed frequency of core-damage accidents at the Ku-
dankulam reactors, which we denote by µkk = 10
−7(ry)−1, then a simple order of
magnitude estimate for the cost of insurance for this amount is
ip = µkk × ℓcap = Rs. 2, 500.
A reactor with a capacity of 1000 MW, operating at a 80% load-factor, should produce
E = 0.8× 106 × 365× 24 kWh ≈ 7× 109 kWh of electricity each year. So, the cost of
insurance above should lead to an increase in the cost of electricity by
δp =
ip
E
= 3.6× 10−7 Rs./kWh!
This absurdly small number indicates that something is amiss with the industry’s claim
that liability will lead to price increases.
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In fact two factors of about about 103 and 104, which are missing in the calculation
above, are required to make sense of the industry’s reluctance. The first is that nuclear
accidents could lead to damage that is a thousand times more than the cap on liability.
For example, some estimates of the economic damage at Fukushima are as high as
ℓreal ≈ USD 200 billion ≈ Rs. 12 lakh crores. (See Table 4 of [37].)
In principle, a future Indian government could ignore the liability cap and insist
on recovering larger costs from the supplier. Even this would not lead to a prohibitive
cost of insurance if reactors were genuinely as safe as manufacturers’ claim. The other
crucial missing factor comes from our result above: accidents affecting the public are
likely to happen at a rate that is closer to ν lrobs. Extending our simple linear model with
these realistic estimates of damage and risk leads to the following cost of insurance per
unit energy produced
δptrue =
ν lrobs × ℓreal
E
= 0.56 Rs./Kwh.
This is now a significant fraction (roughly 10%) of the cost of electricity. However,
at this point, corrections to our linear model for the insurance premium become signifi-
cant. For example, since the total amount involved, ℓreal, is very high, and the expected
rate νlrobs is non-negligible, financial institutions would evidently be unwilling to under-
write this risk without additional incentives in the form of a significantly higher cost of
insurance. This helps explain why suppliers insist on legislative indemnity, rather than
simply arranging for the appropriate financial cover.
What the debate on liability shows is that the nuclear industry — both in the
private and the public sector — has itself taken note of the empirical rates of accidents,
and it is unwilling to take the predictions of its PRAs seriously when its economic
interests are at stake.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, by means of some simple Bayesian calculations, we have come to the fol-
lowing conclusion: the historical record contradicts the predictions of probabilistic risk
assessment and suggests a significantly higher risk of nuclear accidents. The contra-
diction between these predictions and data can be quantified in terms of a probability
for the hypothesis that true frequencies of accidents are as small as those predicted.
This probability can be quantified in various models, and is found to be extraordinar-
ily small in a model-independent fashion, and independent of changes in our detailed
assumptions. In particular, in section 6 we showed how, even in models where safety
standards improve exponentially with operating experience or where reactors in a given
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region are assumed to be considerably safer than reactors elsewhere, the conclusions
above hold at very high confidence levels.
Second, we also specifically discussed the case of India. Although this is strictly
speaking, a subset of the study of worldwide accident frequencies above, we analyzed it
separately to show that India’s current India’s current experience with nuclear reactor
operation is far from sufficient to draw any strong conclusions about future reactor
safety. The same conclusions hold for other countries with similar levels of operating
experience, such as Canada, China, Belgium and Korea.
Therefore it is clear that the methodology and practice of PRA needs to be revised
significantly.
In fact, as we showed in section 8, it is clear from the debate on nuclear liability
that the nuclear industry already recognizes that the results of PRA are numerically
unreliable. Nevertheless, within the technical community, the use of PRA is sometimes
justified as a useful tool for safety analysis. For example, the authors of [9] explained
that even though PRA is “not thought to represent the true risks” it remains useful
as a “platform for technical exchanges on safety matters between regulators and the
industry.” However, this begs the question: why has PRA failed so badly in achieving
the purpose that it was designed for. Indeed, the Rasmussen report [11] started by
explaining that “the objective of the study was to make a realistic estimate of [the]
risks” that would be “involved in potential accidents.”
Apart from the theoretical problems mentioned in the introduction, it appears
likely that the nuclear industry benefits from the disingenuous suggestion that it can,
in fact, accurately predict the frequency of accidents. Although insiders recognize that
this is not the case, it is clear that the detailed computer simulations that support a
supposedly-scientific calculation of low accident-frequencies computed to several deci-
mal places are useful in public debates. While there have been other critiques of the
mismatch between the results of PRA and empirical data, we believe that this study
is significant because it emphasizes the extraordinarily high level of confidence with
which it is possible to rule out the results of PRA.
Indeed, this would hardly be the only situation in which the nuclear industry has
attempted to use the authority of science to dismiss safety concerns. For example, in an
attempt to dismiss the history of Chernobyl, the World Nuclear Association declared
[38] in January 2011 that “In the light of better understanding of the physics and
chemistry of material in a reactor core . . . it became evident that even a severe core
melt coupled with breach of containment could not in fact create a major radiological
disaster from any Western reactor design” (emphasis added). After attempting to
initially defend this claim for a few days after Fukushima by claiming that “clearly
there was no major release from the reactors”[39] and only from the “fuel pools”, the
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Association had to reluctantly concede that its claim, seemingly based on rigorous
material science, “did not apply to all” [40] Western reactor designs.
It is interesting to note that a similar dynamic operates in other industries as
well. For example, in the aviation industry (which inspired the use of PRA for nuclear
reactors), as part of the certification process for its new 787 “Dreamliner” aircraft,
Boeing estimated that its lithium-ion batteries would vent smoke “once in every 10
million flight hours.” In fact this event occurred twice in 52,000 flight hours leading to
the grounding of the entire fleet for inspection [41]
To explore the implications of our conclusions, we return to the case of India where
the government is planning a large nuclear expansion. It has announced plans to
commence construction on 8 heavy water reactors, with a capacity of 5600 MW in the
“12th Plan” period (2012–17), and complete work on a separate 2800 MW of installed
capacity. In addition, it is also planning to import 8 reactors with a total capacity of
10,500 MW [42]. Every reactor site has seen vigorous local protest movements that
have raised issue of land and livelihood but also questions about nuclear safety.
Therefore it is imperative to have a frank conversation on nuclear safety, involv-
ing not just the technical community but a far broader cross-section of society. Our
results show that such a debate should start with the acceptance that the ambitious
claims about nuclear safety made on the basis of probabilistic risk assessment have
been conclusively falsified by the empirical data.
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